COSAC has played an active role in fostering and developing interparliamentary cooperation since it has proven to be an effective model that has helped shape a supranational layer of influence for NPs. The central question addressed here is to assess whether COSAC is currently structured to allow NPs to obtain more information and access to the policy and decision-making circuits at EU level and, therefore, if NPs are benefiting from COSAC or are they, on the contrary, lagging behind and lost amidst so many interparliamentary meetings?
Introduction
Exactly ten years have passed since the Treaty of Lisbon was signed at the Jerónimo's monastery in the Portuguese capital, enshrining, for the first time in European Union (EU) integration, the acknowledgement of the active role and involvement of national Parliaments (NPs) in EU affairs.
I For decades, the European Treaties neither regulated, nor envisaged, any substantive relations between NPs and the European Community/European Union institutions. Their role in EU affairs was therefore largely overlooked and considered only as far as its domestic/national dimension was concerned.
The Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of the Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) has played an active role in developing the effectiveness of inter-parliamentary cooperation for it has -as we attempt to demonstrate -proved to be an effective model and, to some extent, a pioneer in inter-parliamentary cooperation, playing a decisive role in mainstreaming the importance of NPs as actors that possess certain democratic qualities and responsibilities, including the maintenance of popular legitimacy, and the scrutiny of executive power in EU affairs.
This essay is written by a practitioner and a direct observer of these phenomena for exactly ten years, which almost coincides with the moment when the Treaty of Lisbon was brought to life. This has allowed me the privilege of witnessing its entry into legal force and its operative implementation, its interpretation and the changes it produced and induced in the behaviour of a number of players in the EU institutional system, in particular NPs.
II
Thus, the approach taken is mostly empirical and heuristic, i.e. a standard technique based on professional experience to promote and develop a more in-depth knowledge of a scientific area, oriented towards problem-solving and the identification of new patterns of behaviour of the institutional actors who operate in this environment, i.e., NPs. From a theoretical perspective, a 'broader neo-institutionalist' approach is used, assuming that
'institutions are not neutral containers fulfilling certain functional needs, but interact with, and are subject

Parliaments in the European Union of the Treaty of Lisbon, COSAC 'may submit any contribution it deems appropriate for the attention of the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission. The Conference shall in addition promote the exchange of information and best practice between national Parliaments and the European Parliament, including their special committees. It may also organise interparliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of common foreign and security policy, including common security and defence policy.'
In terms of composition, each national Parliament can be represented by a maximum of six Members of its Committee for Union Affairs, and the EP also has a delegation of six Members. Moreover, three members of the Parliaments of each candidate country can be invited as observers.
Therefore, the central question we aim to answer in this paper is to assess is how NPs can increase the critical level of cooperation at COSAC, needed to address the challenges they face in their daily activity of scrutiny of EU affairs: Is inter-parliamentary cooperation at this Conference currently configured to allow NPs to obtain more information and access to the policy and decision-making circuits at EU level? Are NPs benefiting from COSAC or are they, on the contrary, lagging behind and lost amidst so many meetings?
In order to find an adequate reply to these questions, the author has developed elsewhere a taxonomy of the current range of meetings in the context of interparliamentary cooperation and tries to measure the influence that national parliaments exert in each one of them (Dias Pinheiro 2017: 95-102) . For the sake of comparison, the most relevant examples of meetings that currently take place were chosen, leaving aside ongoing developments (e.g. the establishment of the Joint Parliament Scrutiny Group on EUROPOL), and choosing certain criteria (legal or political basis, existence of Rules of Procedure (RoP), agenda-setting, secretariat, composition and adoption of conclusions)
that allow conclusions to be drawn on the added-value and influence of national E -112 parliaments in scrutiny of EU affairs. The perspective adopted here considers that the influence that can be played by national parliaments stems from four main factors: i) the Chairmanship and the place where the meeting is held;
ii) who takes the lead in the setting of the agenda;
iii) who provides the Secretariat, and iv) the possibility of adopting conclusions or contributions, including the voting arrangements for this purpose.
To a lesser extent, the composition of delegations is also important, for two reasons: i) if voting is involved, an adequate balance and compromise has to be found. In this context, COSAC is a fairly good example, because national parliaments and the EP are on equal footing in terms of delegations (six Members each), which has been deemed appropriate given the scope and mission of COSAC. If the adoption of any decision is made by consensus, numbers are less relevant in that a small number of parliaments is enough to block any decision;
ii) speaking time, because the larger the delegations, the less time is available for debate.
Concerning the place of COSAC in this matrix, the conclusion is that the Conference is the locale where the influence of NPs can be considered as relatively high, for the following reasons: the national Parliament who holds the Presidency has considerable room for manoeuvre in defining the agenda, i.e. topics and guests, and conducting the debates. Moreover, the Presidency is assisted by the COSAC Secretariat in all its tasks, which performs its duties under the political responsibility of the COSAC Presidency and the Presidential Troika, which comprises the three NPs of the trio and the EP, in each semester. The COSAC Secretariat, where NPs are preponderant, is the only Permanent Secretariat in inter-parliamentary cooperation in the EU. The results of its work are of considerable importance to NPs, not only in streamlining the procedures of COSAC itself but also the knowledge-enhancing output it produces (i.e. Bi-annual Reports of COSAC, background documents). Finally, the influence of NPs in COSAC is higher with regard to the Contribution adopted, not only because it is drafted by the Presidency of the Parliament, but also because, if consensus is not reached, a voting procedure follows in which no single delegation can alone block its adoption. Given that the Contribution adopted by COSAC is sent to the EU institutions, which are invited to react to points E -113 raised therein, NPs have been using this tool to 'gain access to' certain dossiers, calling for a reply from the institutions.
COSAC therefore occupies a central role in inter-parliamentary cooperation, especially as it is based on a governance model that gives NPs a stronger say in the running of events.
As Ian Cooper also concluded in a recent work, concerning the three IPCs (IPCs), III 
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Against this background, this paper aims at putting forward some ideas and approaches regarding the role of COSAC in the effectiveness of inter-parliamentary cooperation. In fact, and while acknowledging that the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) is a very important legal tool available to NPs, for it gives them a specific role in the EU decisionmaking process, it should not, however, prevent them from engaging in the policy-making process. In fact, the scrutiny of EU affairs by NPs is a dynamic process that encompasses several dimensions beyond the eight-week period dedicated to subsidiarity. For that reason, COSAC also has a role to play in the context of the recent trend that sees a shift in the motivation that drives this cooperation; here we see a gradual movement from a combination of efforts to produce a negative output, by blocking proposals on the basis of a breach of the subsidiarity principle in an EWM-obsessed way, to, more importantly, an active ex ante process proposing new paths and solutions (e.g. the green card, for instance, see below).
Thus, and for the purpose of this essay, it is more prudent to refer to COSAC as the promoter of a set of practices that has contributed to the establishment of a layer of supranational exchange of information, knowledge and ways to perform scrutiny among NPs. This process has allowed them to play a more effective role in the oversight and monitoring of a system of EU governance with increasing features of intergovernmentalism (e.g. the Fiscal Compact, the role of the European Council as an institution, the influence of the Eurogroup, etc), but which also poses new challenges for COSAC in order to be relevant and effective in the system of inter-parliamentary cooperation after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force.
COSAC: Current Challenges and Shortcomings
COSAC should be considered as one of the most important pillars of interparliamentary cooperation. In fact, and despite a recent trend to evaluate COSAC in a negative way, emphasising the difficulties it now faces and overlooking its history and importance, COSAC has had an incomparable prominence in the affirmation of NPs within the EU system of governance since the Conference's establishment in 1989. This trend is sometimes unconsciously present, as illustrated by the introductory remarks in The COSAC Secretariat published in January 2014 a historical overview of this Conference which shows that it has been, since its origins, the only forum where, for many years, parliamentarians from all Member-States, the EP and candidate countries could meet to discuss and exchange views and best practice on the most relevant issues of European integration.
VII
It would suffice to go through the agendas of COSAC meetings to conclude how it has addressed and debated virtually every topic in EU integration, fostering an ownership of the different dossiers by NPs, promoting an exchange of views amongst them on these subjects, and bringing closer the best practice and ways of working of these Parliaments in EU affairs.
VIII
One clear example of the above is the decisive role played by COSAC in the framework of the constitutional process which began with the European Convention and led to the Treaty of Lisbon. In fact, COSAC followed the proceedings of the Convention both closely and actively, because many parliamentarians participating at COSAC were at the same time representatives of their Parliaments in the Convention, which created a certain synergy between the two. This established a new layer at the EU level, not only because Parliaments were formally associated with the wider EU governance system that was steering the debate and taking the decisions (Convention), but also because it gave unprecedented momentum to cooperation and exchange between them, both at the two working groups at the Convention dedicated to NPs (WG 4) and to Subsidiarity (WG 1), but also in the multiple discussions that took place at COSAC from that moment 
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exchange and cooperation amongst themselves that would not exist otherwise. Moreover, its importance is confirmed by that fact that it is explicitly mentioned by the EU Treaties.
Nevertheless, one must always bear in mind that different Parliaments expect different things from their participation in COSAC: some see the Conference playing a more active role, while others give it a lesser and more restrictive responsibility. From an empirical point view, it would be enough to attend a COSAC plenary and to observe how difficult and controversial it always is to reach agreement between 41 Parliamentary chambers and the EP on the Contribution to be adopted by the Conference.
Observation of the evolution of COSAC, and the impact and influence it has had on the advancement of the work of NPs in EU affairs, makes it clear that it has engendered a learning process among Parliaments over the years. It has provided them with comparative information and practice on how to tackle the challenges of EU integration (e.g., subsidiarity checks) and has been especially helpful in strengthening their capacities to deal with the prerogatives enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon. Therefore, COSAC has helped to Europeanise NPs, X influencing their procedures, institutional behaviours and ownership of EU affairs. It has also assisted them in streamlining their approaches to the difficulties they have been facing in adapting to the changing environment of EU multi-level governance.
On the other hand, and without detriment to the role played by the EU Speakers'
Conference, COSAC has been the main forum ensuring institutional continuity and memory, coherence and stability in inter-parliamentary cooperation. To this effect, the set up and development of the COSAC Secretariat (the only permanent secretariat of interparliamentary cooperation at EU level) has been an outstanding landmark. It is a unique feature of COSAC and one of its most important working tools, and is of benefit to all NPs and the EP.
However, COSAC faces nowadays many difficulties and challenges. Some argue that 'COSAC has not evolved significantly', XI which brings about unprecedented challenges, both external and internal.
Firstly, other than the EU Speakers' Conference, COSAC had been, until very recently, the only established and structured forum of regular meetings between parliamentarians dealing with the EU. This meant that the scope of the topics COSAC could cover was quite broad, because there was no other meeting point for Members to network and exchange best practice. This has been an interesting and positive development, because this multi-polarised system of inter-parliamentary cooperation has shaped a supranational layer of influence for NPs, where they develop ownership of matters on which their national Governments decide and negotiate at EU level, exchange information and best practice on the ways to scrutinise and monitor EU policies and gain access to information on these matters that otherwise, most likely, they would not gather in such an asymmetrical system as EU governance.
However, all of this has led to external pressure on COSAC, despite its decisive contribution to the development of tools of parliamentary scrutiny which are now of benefit to other parliamentary committees: COSAC is now faced with a certain ambiguity regarding its role and scope as a consequence of the empowerment of other forums, Adding to this exogenous pressure, COSAC faces some internal dilemmas related to its own functioning. Firstly, many Parliaments XII state that the quality of the debates has been the least successful aspect of COSAC meetings, criticising the restricted time available for debate (often one minute per member) and the lengthy presentations given by some of the speakers, which are then not followed up or which do not have any concrete impact on the work of COSAC.
Secondly, COSAC is currently structured around two main events: a meeting of the Chairpersons, which is of a 'preparatory nature' and to 'be held prior to each plenary meeting', and which is attended by the Chairs of all EU affairs Committees and the relevant member of the EP; and the COSAC plenary meeting itself. As a Conference for exchange of best practice and information, COSAC would benefit from a certain degree of streamlining and coordination between these two meetings.
Thirdly, more importance should be given to the bi-annual report that each COSAC Presidency presents, because despite the intense amount of work invested by all delegations and by the COSAC Secretariat in the drafting of each report, it attracts a very low degree of attention, and is often treated like a procedural item, instead of one of COSAC's most substantial outputs.
In fact, and salient to this paper, no other IPC collects, analyses and produces such lengthy, analytical and long-lasting documents on the most relevant topics of inter- should make better use of existing tools to achieve those goals.
Fourthly, and linked to the above, the Contribution adopted by each COSAC plenary meeting and addressed to the EU institutions is the most politically visible output produced by COSAC at present. It should however be noted that, regardless of the different views COSAC can currently bring a holistic approach to inter-parliamentary cooperation, to collective scrutiny by EU Parliaments, based on its streamlined structures and procedures; for it is acknowledged by the EU institutions to be the focus stakeholder with which to engage, and on the mere circumstance that it is still the only IPC with institutional continuity provided by its Permanent Secretariat.
Some proposals for the reform of COSAC towards more effective interparliamentary cooperation
This essay aims at putting forward some concrete ideas to release the untapped potential that COSAC still has, covering not only its current proceedings and output, but also some thoughts for further reflection on the future strengthening of COSAC.
Firstly, the choice of topics to be discussed in each meeting should focus on the issues that bring direct added-value to the scrutiny work that NPs perform: specific legislative proposals, exchange of best practice on the scrutiny of the activity of national Governments, debates on how to strengthen democratic legitimacy and accountability and exchange of views on policy fields that relate directly to the competences of NPs (e.g. Secondly, the debates ought to be structured in a way that promotes and encourages the development of a parliamentary perspective around the topics chosen, i.e., for each panel and issue to be discussed, parliamentarians should always be included as key-note speakers, alongside Commissioners and members of national Governments.
Moreover, the Presidency should attempt, wherever possible, to steer debates towards this parliamentary perspective, in a way that enriches the scrutiny of the same policy fields or specific proposals being undertaken in national capitals. For the same reason, the Contribution to be adopted should mirror the debates and exchanges that actually took place during the meeting, seeking to influence and obtain a reply from the European institutions to the issues and concerns raised by the constituent Parliaments.
If this were to be achieved, COSAC would be uniquely placed to continue promoting a 'collective ownership' by Parliaments of the EU, prior to a stage of 'collective scrutiny' stricto sensu. In the majority of cases the focus and priorities of Parliaments differ immensely, and the fact that those priorities are not coordinated jeopardises a more structured and collective scrutiny.
To overcome this limitation and obstacle, and to fully engage in a collective scrutiny approach, it would be worth going back to a successful practice developed by COSAC prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon: coordinated (subsidiarity) checks. In fact, COSAC coordinated three subsidiarity checks carried out under the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon.
XV The selection procedure adopted was quite simple: each Parliament would put forward two proposals for scrutiny, COSAC would gather a list of them and the one or two proposals that would gather more support would be subject to a collective scrutiny.
Unfortunately, this methodology and procedure was abandoned after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, for various reasons: namely a conviction among some NPs that coordinated checks would became an obsolete concept after the Treaty's entry into force, 
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while others argued that it placed too much emphasis on subsidiarity from a negative standpoint, i.e., to block proposals. This second argument should be given further consideration, namely assessing whether the idea of choosing proposals to scrutinise collectively should be revived, not necessarily only from a subsidiarity perspective, but to promote a simultaneous check on global EU issues. These might include the future of the Eurozone and its democratic accountability Some might argue that this could encroach on the remit of some of the other IPCs established recently, but the proposed perspective is that it would instead create some complementarity: COSAC would not be doing the scrutiny and oversight of these policy fields on its own behalf, but gathering information, exchanging best practice and building an acquis of knowledge and literature about these areas, via the Biannual reports and the work of its Secretariat. This could benefit the reinforcement of public policies adopted by the executives, namely the decisions they take at EU level in these domains, fostering more transparency and openness, while promoting a collective scrutiny by NPs. These would be asked at a pre-defined moment in time what are they scrutinising and planning to do on these dossiers, while simultaneously allowing COSAC to build synergies and complementarity with other IPCs.
Cooperation between COSAC and other inter-parliamentary conferences
In the relationship of COSAC with the new IPCs and with the EU Speakers' Conference, a good practice that has been implemented in the past is worth signalling: on a number of occasions, the Presidency of the EU Speakers' Conference was invited to deliver a short briefing at the COSAC Plenary, highlighting and giving notice of its main decisions and achievements. This approach should be generalised as a standing invitation 
COSAC and the choice of priorities for scrutiny: the Commission Work Programme
With the idea of promoting coordinated scrutiny exercises, either on subsidiarity or on a specific policy field, and the network of collaboration between IPCs to be developed in which COSAC has a key role to play, another very important step is inextricably linked to these two: the choice of priorities for scrutiny by NPs. While far from being a new topic, it is worth revisiting. In 2015, and at the initiative of the Dutch delegation at COSAC (the Tweede Kamer, at the time), all NPs were encouraged to set up a list of priorities for scrutiny based on the European Commission Work Programme (ECWP) for that year, which would then be compiled by the COSAC Secretariat and sent to the European Commission.
In the replies given to the 25th Biannual Report of COSAC, XVI the majority 'considered it either "somewhat useful" or "very useful" to produce such an annual overview to be shared with all Parliaments/Chambers and sent to the European Commission and other EU institutions'. Moreover, this collective scrutiny approach could also expand to dossiers and topics other that those subject to subsidiarity review, including the substance of proposals in the light of the more ownership-oriented dynamics that the political dialogue with the European Commission has fostered in recent years.
The Green Card Procedure
One of the most interesting developments of inter-parliamentary cooperation in recent years was the initiative of the 'green card' which refers to the possibility for NPs to suggest a legislative initiative to the Commission. This idea seeks to capitalise on the willingness of NPs who seek greater involvement in the legislative process; this would give them the opportunity of playing a proactive role in the EU agenda-setting process and further contribute to the good functioning of the EU, in addition to existing forms of parliamentary scrutiny and involvement.
In fact, this is also a response to criticism of the yellow card procedure and the logic behind it; this is often seen as a negative process as it gives NPs a right, under certain strict conditions, to indicate that a legislative proposal should not be proceeded with. This was As mentioned by Jančić , while some authors like Fabbrini and Granat (2013: 117) argue that a 'a misuse of the subsidiarity review' should be avoided, advocating a narrow reading of the subsidiarity mechanism, others like Goldoni (2014: 107) and Kiiver (2012: 545; 2008: 82) argue in favour of the broadening of the early warning mechanism to put substance and content (i.e. politics) ahead of subsidiarity and procedure. The EWM has been one of the most visible features of the increased role played by NPs since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. Moreover, COSAC has been instrumental not only in promoting a learning process among Parliaments to improve their access to information and streamline their scrutiny procedures, but also in providing the opportunity to meet and exchange views on specific legislative dossiers. Nevertheless, it can also be argued that, in order to improve its effectiveness in inter-parliamentary cooperation, Parliaments and COSAC should move away from the attraction of subsidiarity, as important as might be, towards a more positive and forward-thinking role.
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In fact, COSAC is the only Conference with the membership (EU affairs Committees and a generalist and broader political approach), the institutional continuity and memory, and the means (biannual report and Contribution) to place 'Parliaments on the offensive'.
Of the many proposals put forward by NPs in recent years, XXIV alluded to profusely in a previous work (Dias Pinheiro 2017: 103) , Jančić labels the proliferation of initiatives as the According to this reasoning, if the 'late card' were to lead Parliaments, collectively, to consider that their requests on subsidiarity grounds had not been met, they could individually decide -in accordance with their internal constitutional and legal requirements -to take the matter to Court. It is here that COSAC, with its extensive experience with institutional matters and coordinating collective checks, would be uniquely placed to promote this joint scrutiny. COSAC thus has a great opportunity, and indeed a significant responsibility, to influence the outcome of this task force -several contributions have already been tabled by NPs over the last years, assembling experience, knowledge and practice that can now finally be put on the This is a rather bold initiative, for it acknowledges something NPs have demanded for a long time, i.e., that the opinions could and should address issues other than subsidiarity and, at the same time, presents the idea of some streamlining on the criteria to issue those opinions.
Recommendation #6 states that the co-legislators 'should use consistently the subsidiarity grid during their negotiations' and that 'the Commission should highlight (…) any views it receives from local and regional authorities'. Moreover, recommendation #3
recognises that 'The Commission should apply flexibly the Treaty-based 8 weeks deadline for national Parliaments to submit their reasoned opinions' taking account of 'common holiday periods and recess periods' and determining that the Commission should 'respond as far as possible, within 8 weeks of receiving each opinion', which would be a positive outcome, given the delays that currently exist. 
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Other recommendations address issues such as: the need to raise national, local and regional authorities' awareness of the opportunities to engage at an early stage of the decision-making process; the responsibility of the Commission in ensuring that its assessments consider territorial impacts; and the linkage between platforms like REGPEX, designed to support the participation of regions with legislative powers in the early phase of the EU legislative procedure, the Early Warning System, and IPEX, the platform for the mutual exchange of information between the national Parliaments and the European Parliament concerning issues related to the European Union, especially in light of the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon.. Finally, the report recommends that the Commission develop a mechanism to identify and evaluate legislation from the perspective of subsidiarity, proportionality, simplification, legislative density and the role of local and regional authorities, and also calls on the next Commission, along with the EP and the Council, to reflect the need for more effective implementation, rather than initiating new legislation in areas where the existing body of legislation is mature and/or has recently been substantially revised.
COSAC should immediately take the lead in the debate in the merits and implementation of these recommendations.
Conclusion
Ten years after the Treaty of Lisbon was signed, a multi-polarised system of interparliamentary cooperation has emerged, characterised by the empowerment of other Committees in the scrutiny of sectoral EU affairs, the establishment of other IPCs and the changing role ascribed to the previous sole drivers of that cooperation, i.e. COSAC and NPs' EU Affairs Committees.
The point of view presented here is that COSAC should occupy a leading role in that system, especially as it is based on a governance model that gives NPs a stronger say in the running of events. In fact, collective scrutiny is also the capacity of IPCs to organise themselves in an open and constructive way, not narrowly focused in their specific policy domain, but with a level of awareness of the global implications of inter-parliamentary cooperation. In this respect, COSAC is the IPC with the 'global picture' and therefore in a unique position, not only to coordinate the work of other IPCs, but also to establish a level of outreach towards them that brings coherence to the overall system. The proposals presented in this paper point in that direction, namely with regard to a reform of the proceedings of COSAC meetings, promoting the selection of topics to address that brings direct added-value to the scrutiny work that NPs perform and that promotes a political and parliamentary perspective around those issues; this will promote a coordinated assessment of different policy dossiers (legislative and non-legislative, e.g. future of eurozone, Brexit).
Regarding cooperation between Conferences, this paper advocates that a standing invitation be established between the various Conferences (namely COSAC, CFSP/CSDP and Article 13) to host a representative from each other in order to give a briefing on the latest developments and achievements within their remits, building confidence and facilitating dialogue. On a more ambitious note, the responsibilities of the COSAC secretariat should be expanded to support other IPCs, with a more proactive and analytical ambit, gathering at the end of each year the list of topics and conclusions/contribution adopted by the IPCs and producing a report with the main findings of inter-parliamentary cooperation.
This leads to a final remark -the effectiveness of COSAC depends not only on what NPs are capable of doing by themselves, in streamlining their procedures and scrutiny systems or even agreeing with the establishment of new inter-parliamentary fora, but also on the response, and engagement, of the European institutions to this process. In fact, a lot has been done by the EU institutions since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force to enhance the role of NPs from a legal and procedural point of view. However, a lot remains to be done concerning their actual political response, namely from the European Commission, in taking into due consideration the contribution of Parliaments in EU public policies. Regardless of the different views that NPs have on EU issues, notwithstanding the prerogatives and responsibilities that they ought to exert at the national level, there is an EU parliamentary dimension to decision making and to the implementation of EU public policies that cannot be politically neglected by EU institutions. Hopefully, future essays of this sort will shift academic attention towards the analysis of what the EU institutions are doing to promote inter-parliamentary cooperation as a truly effective bidirectional exercise.
